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ARGUMENTS 
I. ADDITIONAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In its statement of facts, plaintiff has made several factual errors in its 
representations to this Court which are addressed below: 
A. Melvin was employed as an account executive for Franklin Covey Co. 
(hereinafter FCC and its predecessor companies) from 1992 to 1997.1 It is 
undisputed between the parties that Melvin was employed by FCC from 
1992 to 1995 in his home country, the United Kingdom, where he excelled 
at his job and that the issues arising in this case relate solely to his later 
employment from 1995 to 1997 in the U.S. by FCC. (See Attachment B, 
Appellant's Brief, Declaration of David Melvin, page 1.) 
B. Melvin's Maryland claim was one for unjust enrichment not 
quantum meruit. (See Appellee's Addendum, tab 2, Exhibit B.) The 
complaint actually alleges a claim for unjust enrichment.2 
1
 It is interesting plaintiff overlooks this fact since he later uses trips taken during this 
earlier period to buttress his extremely weak claim regarding both Melvin's ties to 
Utah and their nexus to business he conducted in Utah. 
2
 The complaint states: 
"[8.] Franklin terminated Melvin from his employment with the company as of 
September 12,1997. Franklin did not pay Melvin any severance or other 
compensation in connection with his termination. After Franklin terminated 
Melvin's employment Franklin paid Melvin commissions for all sales of services and 
products that were delivered before September 12,1997 
[9] Franklin failed to pay Melvin commissions that he earned on sales contracts 
entered into prior to the termination of his employment, but for which Franklin has 
not yet delivered the service or product (at the time of his termination.) 
1 
Count I of the draft complaint specifically alleges that "it would be inequitable 
for Franklin to retain the benefits of Melvin's efforts without compensating him, that 
it breached its implied contact and was unjustly enriched. The count clearly states that it 
is an action for unjust enrichment and requests that equity be done. Melvin's 
compensation letter (Appellee's Addendum 4B) only states that he will be paid 
commission on "anything you sell." 
C. Plaintiffs claim that Melvin did not preserve the mechanical 
adoption issue is patently false. As has been its consistent practice, 
[10.] The sale of Franklin's products and services generally requires the salesman to 
contact a potential customer, spend hours learning about the customer's business, 
develop an understanding of the customer's training needs, and educate the customer 
about how Franklin's services and products would meet the customer's needs. 
[11] It is the nature of Franklin's business that sales contracts are rarely signed 
when a sales person first contacts a prospective customer. Sales are based on a 
relationship between the customer and Franklin that the sales person develops. 
Competitors of Franklin have products and services that fill the same needs as 
Franklin's products and services, so the relationship that the sales person develops is 
a critical factor in a sale. The relationship may also help Franklin sell other products 
(for which the sales person does not receive a commission). The sales contracts are 
often signed months or even years after the sales person does the work in developing 
the relationship. 
[12.] Melvin spent a large percentage of his time meeting with prospective 
customers and educating them about Franklin's services and products. He received 
no compensation for these efforts on Franklin's behalf. (Nor were these duties set 
forth in the document plaintiff refers to as the Compensation Agreement.) 
[13.] At least eight customers (itemized in the draft complaint placed orders with 
Franklin, through Melvin, before September 12,1997, but did not receive the services 
or products before September 12,1997. Franklin failed to pay a commission to 
Melvin for these sales. 
[14.] At least one customer placed one or more order with Franklin after September 
12,1997 as a direct result of Melvin's sales efforts. Franklin has not Melvin a 
commission on there sales." 
2 
plaintiff sets forth only half sentences or those half of the facts that it 
believes support its position and conveniendy ignores the rest. This issue 
was raised before the trial court in Melvin's Reply Memorandum (See 
Attachment A to this brief, page 3.) 
II. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT MELVIN IS 
SUBJECT TO THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF T H E UTAH 
COURTS. 
The most important issue in this case is the lack of personal jurisdiction. 
Even plaintiff, grudgingly, has admitted that the standard of review on this issue is 
correction of error or the de novo review and, lacking jurisdiction, the case fails. 
Plaintiff, understandably buries this issue at the back of his brief because he has 
simply failed to show that the record supports the trial court's finding 
Plaintiffs most notable argument, that he advances innumerable times 
because he has no other facts to support this claim is that Melvin made ten trips to 
Utah (over a period of 5.9 years.) The defendant asks this Court to examine these 
trips carefully. Five occurred before plaintiff acknowledges that Melvin was 
employed by FCC and while Melvin was still a resident of the U.K. They are all 
distant in time and purpose, all were for training and conferences; all were undertaken 
at FCCs instigation; and all but one were of extremely short duration. Even if this 
Court gives credence to the plaintiffs argument that the trips themselves somehow 
are evidence of defendant's transacting business within the state, the defendant 
contends that there must be a logical nexus between the timing of the trips and the 
3 
dispute before this Court. Of the remaining 5 trips — all were short and undertaken 
at FCC's instigation; 4 were for training or conferences (at which no sales activity of 
any kind or nature has been alleged by either side), in fact Melvin was a relatively 
passive participant The remaining trip, one day» also made at FCCs request for a 
client meeting with GEC. It is from this one meeting on the GEC account in which 
plaintiff finds a nexus to Utah because Melvin, in his Maryland complaint, alleged he 
procured a major new customer for FCC. However, the customer, GEC, is not a 
Utah corporation nor does it have any ties to Utah. The meeting took place in Utah 
because FCC wanted it in Utah. Melvin was asked to attend because GEC was UK 
based and Melvin, a UK citizen, had had a business relationship with GEC when he 
worked in the UK. No sales were consummated at that time and all further contacts 
and development took place in Maryland and New Jersey. In Roskelly & Co. v. Lerco, 
610 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1980) the Court found that no personal jurisdiction existed on 
facts that were stronger than those in the instant case. (In Koskelley, plaintiff 
contacted defendant, a Kentucky corporation, for assistance in the repair of a 
machine manufactured by the defendant, sold to a non Utah resident who eventually 
sold it to the plaintiff, a Utah resident. Employees of the defendant went to Utah to 
supervise the installation and adjustment of the equipment in plaintiffs Utah plant. 
The Court found that the entry into Utah by the defendant's employees was solely for 
supervising the installation of the equipment and that, alone, did not constitute 
purposeful contacts with Utah that would support a finding of jurisdiction.) 
Presumably the defendant in Koskelley received compensation for its services while in 
4 
Utah which Mr. Melvin has not. Melvin has never received any compensation for 
either the trip, his time or from the proceeds of the contract. The facts in the instant 
case are weaker than those before the Roskelly court and clearly do not support a 
finding of special personal jurisdiction against the defendant. 
In Burger King v. Rud^euirica, All U.S. 462,472 (1985) the court stated that the 
fair warning requirement was met "if the defendant purposefully directed his 
activities at residents of the forum and the litigation results from alleged 
injuries that 'arise out of or related to5 these activities." The court noted that it is 
not sufficient to meet the fair warning requirement where the plaintiff unilaterally 
reaches beyond the forum. In the present case Melvin did not direct his activities 
toward residents of Utah. He directed his activities, as set forth in his initial contract 
with FCC and continued in the subsequent letter of agreement, to the Eastern 
Region. The only reason for his presence in Utah was that the plaintiff required him 
to attend meetings in Utah. His only business meeting was at plaintiffs behest with a 
non Utah corporation. The Burger King court, quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 
(1958) stated, "the defendant, by its own acts must purposefully avail itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits 
and protections of its laws." The facts alleged by the plaintiff are legally insufficient. 
Further it should be noted that all of the facts plaintiff alleges to support its 
allegations are derived from affidavits of the defendant. Plaintiff is a Utah 
corporation based in Utah where the majority of its employees live and work. All of 
its top personnel are in Utah and therefore, presumably available to plaintiff to 
5 
provide documentation as to defendant's alleged business activities in Utah. 
However, despite this wealth of resources plaintiff fails to provide this Court with 
anything to support its claim. In RoskeHey at page 1310, the court noted "[W]here 
jurisdiction is challenged, plaintiff cannot solely rely on allegations of jurisdiction in 
the face of an affidavit by defendant which specifically contradicts those general 
allegations.". In Newqys, Inc. v. Mc Causland, 950 P.2d 420 (Utah 1993) quoting 
Anderson v. American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 825 (Utah 1990) the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that plaintiff must establish jurisdiction by a preponderance of 
the evidence after making a prima facie showing before trial." Melvin notes that 
plaintiff has intentionally declined to support its allegations with any declaration or 
affidavit and has failed to meet its burden. 
Where the Utah Courts have found that limited contacts by a defendant with 
the forum state convey personal jurisdiction invariably there has been some real or 
incipient harm to a Utah resident, unlike the instant case. Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co., 
Inc. 815 P.2d 246 (Utah App. 1991) (the parties agreement, while made out of state, 
was made with the understanding that the disputed services would be performed in Utah. 
Over eighteen years, defendants availed themselves of the services of a Utah resident 
and suit arose over dispute regarding payment to the Utah resident for those services.) 
Newajs, supra (out of state defendant initiated contact with Utah resident to solicit 
business orders from Utah residents, defendant's actions injured Utah resident.) See also 
Burt Drilling? Inc. v. Portadrill, 608 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980) (defendant initiated contact, to 
supply goods to a Utah resident reasonably knowing goods would be used in the state.) 
6 
On facts alleging stronger ties to the forum state than those alleged by 
plaintiff, the Utah courts have found a lack of specific personal jurisdiction. See 
Roskelley, supra; Bradford v. Nagle 763 R2d 791 (Utah 19SS); Arguello v. Industrial 
Woodworking Marchine Co., 838 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1992) 
"Generally, the more closely related the contacts are to the cause of action for 
which jurisdiction is taken, the fewer contacts are necessary to establish jurisdiction." 
Rocky Mountain Claim Staking v. William, 884 P.2d 1301-2 (Utah App. 1994), conversely 
where the nexus between the contact and the cause of action is non existent, one 
allegation that defendant once, at his employer's insistence, provided support on a 
sale in Utah to a non Utah corporation for one day is hardly sufficient to support 
plaintiffs allegation of in personam jurisdiction. 
III. THE ISSUE OF MECHANICAL ADOPTION WAS RAISED 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND THE TRIAL COURT HAD AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO RULE ON IT. 
Plaintiff quotes defendant's brief out of context. The sentence quoted in 
plaintiffs brief relates to the fact that this issue wasn't raised until the filing of the 
post trial motions because it wasn't relevant until after the trial court's initial rulings. 
(See Attachment A, page 3). Therefore, the issue was properly raised before the trial 
court and the trial court had an opportunity to rule on it which it failed to do. 
Defendant has raised no other argument, as it cannot, to support its 
contention that the trial court did not mechanically adopt findings of fact and 
conclusions of law prepared for it and presented to it by counsel for the 
plaintiff. Clearly plaintiffs counsel having presumably searched the record of the 
7 
case admits defeat, that there is nothing in the record that indicates the indicia 
normally accepted by the Appellate Courts in Utah that the trial court adequately 
deliberated or considered the merits of the case. State v. James, 858 P.2d 1012 (Utah 
App. 1993); Alta Industries, Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993); Automatic 
Control Products, Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc. 780 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989); The Bayer Company v. 
UgneU, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER 
JURISDICTION, BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF WAS N O T T H E 
PROPER PARTY, NOR AS AN ASSIGNEE DID PLAINTIFF 
FULFILL ITS NOTICE OBLIGATION TO THE DEFENDANT. 
Plaintiffs contention that there was only one employment relationship is 
unsupported by the facts unless the employment relationship being alleged is 
between the defendant and FCC.3 In response to Melvin's argument that in order 
for plaintiff to be considered an assignee under Utah law per Lynch v. MacDonald, 367 
P.2d 474 (Utah 1962) and to then sue the defendant based upon that assignment, it 
must provide notice to the defendant of the assignment, it has provided one item, a 
W-2 sent to Melvin months after he was terminated. It has conceded the fact, based 
upon Delta Traffic Serfices, Inc. v. Sysco Intermountain Food Serices, 944 F.2d 911, (10th Cir. 
1991), that "the burden of proving an assignment is upon him who claims 
thereunder." Accord Alpine Associates, Inc. v. KP&R, 802 P.2d 1119,1121 (Colo. App. 
3
 In is interesting to note that he also argued that there was only one employer to the trial 
court also, but he appears to have dropped this argument to this Court, perhaps 
because plaintiff has convincingly demonstrated to this Court that wholly owned 
subsidiaries and parent companies are considered separate legal entities under the law. 
8 
1990). By its own admission, the "Consent to be Bound4" "was not an actual 
assignment but merely "notice to the court of the assignment/' and therefore, not 
proof on which the trial court could base its decision regarding the relationship 
between the parties. 
In response to Melvin's argument that he was not provided with adequate 
notice of the assignment, plaintiff repeatedly dredges up the one W-2 provided to 
Melvin in January, 1998 for the tax year, 1997 upon which the name Franklin Covey 
Client Sales (hereinafter FCCS) appears. Until alerted by plaintiffs counsel that this 
item existed, Melvin had been completely unaware that Franklin Covey Client Sales' 
name was on this document or any other. In fact Melvin had never heard of FCCS 
until he was sued by FCCS in Utah. This document should be contrasted with the 
following documents provided to or on behalf of Mr. Melvin by his employer FCC, 
noting FCC (or a predecessor company) as Mr. Melvin's employer: 
a. All letters of appointment/agreement (at least 3) signed by FCC and 
Melvin. 
b. All applications to the INS submitted on Melvin's behalf. 
c. All pay stubs that Melvin received during his employment. 
d. Business cards provided to Melvin by FCC identifying FCC as his 
employer. 
4
 In its brief plaintiff contends that there is "absolutely no dispute between the parties 
to the assignment as to its validity. This is irrelevant since FCC, according to the 
plaintiff is not a party to this matter and therefore, its belief about the assignment is 
immaterial. Defendant has consistendy disputed the validity of the assignment which 
was also addressed before the trial court, in his initial brief and also herein. 
9 
e. Letterhead provided to Melvin by FCC with FCC prominendy 
featured, (not FCCS) for use for Melvin's correspondence on all FCC 
related matters. 
f. Sales reports and forecasts routinely generated by FCC to its employees 
that identify Melvin as a member of the team for the Eastern Region of 
FCC. 
Plaintiff offers the W-2 in the face of this overwhelming evidence, and argues 
that this Court accept it as sufficient notice of the assignment to the defendant as 
required by the Utah Courts, but it is not. In 4447 Associates v. First Security Financial, 
889 P.2d 467,470 (Utah App. 1995) the court notes: [BJecause 4447 Associates 
would benefit from a favorable determination of its rights as an assignee seeking to 
enforce an assignment,// bore the burden of proving First Security received notice of the 
assignment." In 4447 the court found that the mailing of the assignment documents (not 
a mere filing informing the court of their existence several months after the issue 
came before the trial court) with no proof that such documents were received by the 
defendant was insufficient. In accord. People's Finance <& Thrift Co. v. Landes, 503 P.2d 444 
(Utah 1992). In Bank of Salt Lake v. Corp. of President of Church of Later Day Saints, 534 
P.2d 887 (1975), the assignee did send notices of the assignment with copies of the 
assignment documents. While the court seems to accept the actions as adequate 
attempts at notice, it still found the notice inadequate because it was served on an 
employee who had no authority to accept such notice. In any event no such action 
was undertaken by the plaintiff herein. 
10 
What is notable in all these cases is that an actual notice was served (or 
attempted to be served before the commencement of any lawsuit), the notice document 
contained the actual assignment documents as well as notice of the assignment, and they 
were served within a reasonable period of time after the documents were executed. 
Here, plaintiff, by his own admission, merely noticed the court and the defendant that 
an assignment had been made, (after his status to prosecute this suit had been called 
into question by the defendant), the actual assignment was not provided (either to the 
court or the defendant) prior to the court's ruling on the summary or declaratory 
judgments, nor is it clear from the actual document when it was signed. Since it is 
undated, when the actual assignment occurred is unknown.5. In any event, Judge 
Young never addressed the issue of the adequacy of the notice, nor did he make 
findings related to these issues. Moreover, the effect of the so called "Consent to be 
Bound" definitely prejudiced the defendant's rights and under the stand of review set 
5
 Plaintiff notes in his brief that the "Consent to be Bound" was signed by FCCS's 
counsel Defendant challenged plaintiffs counsel's right to sign the document since 
there was no evidence before the Utah Court, that plaintiffs counsel also represented 
FCC. In defense plaintiff claims that Melvin "knew" that plaintiffs counsel 
represented FCC because he filed an appearance on behalf of FCC m a case m federal 
district court in Maryland. He presents no other argument to support his contention 
for the correctness of his behavior. Yet it should be noted that a case has been filed 
in Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland m which Melvin is the plaintiff 
and FCC the defendant. This case has been ongoing for some time. Plaintiff s 
counsel has filed no appearance and, to Melvin's knowledge, and from a review of the 
public record, there is no indication that plaintiffs counsel represents FCC. 
Plaintiffs argument is disingenuous at best and wrong at worst. One appearance in 
federal district court m Maryland hardly provides the land of notice that, for instance, 
a notice of appearance filed in District Court in Utah would provide. Melvin is 
absolutely justified in questioning whether plaintiffs counsel had the capacity or 
authorization to file the questionable "Consent to be Bound," and so should have 
before the trial court. 
11 
forth in 4447 Associates, this Court should declare the action a nuUity. If a nuUity then 
FCCS no longer retains its status as a real party at interest and the suit must be 
dismissed. 
(Plaintiffs arguments regarding the aUeged benefits and additional protections 
offered to the defendant by the executive of this document are disingenuous and self 
serving at best and have already been addressed in Melvin's brief and wiU not be 
repeated here.) 
V. T H E TRIAL COURT ABUSED IT DISCRETION IN FAILING TO 
MAKE ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND T H E N IN 
FINDING THAT THE FACTS PRESENTS IN THE RECORD 
SUPPORTED ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER. 
Plaintiffs counsel incorrecdy aUeges to this Court that it presented "two 
unambiguous and undisputed agreements" to the trial court. While they were 
undisputed and unambiguous by plaintiffs counsel, they were neither to the 
defendant who argued these facts vociferously to the trial court. 
As noted above, plaintiffs counsel, misinterpreting defendant's draft Maryland 
complaint interpreted this case as one for quantum meruit. Rather, as set forth 
above, the complaint clearly requested relief for unjust enrichment or restitution and 
the facts fit such a claim. See Davies v. Olson 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 1987), quoting 
Corbin on Contacts § 19 at 44,46. Also Berrett v. Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984), 
"[TJhe measure of recovery is the law of the benefit conferred on the defendant (the 
defendant's gain) and not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff, see First Inv. Co. v. 
Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687 (Utah 1980), or necessarily the reasonable value of the 
plaintiffs services." "Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and retains 
12 
money or benefits which injustice and equity belong to another." American Towers 
Owners Association, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996) citing 
Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773-776 (Utah 1977). The 
facts set forth in the Maryland complaint clearly support the test for unjust 
enrichment set forth by the Utah Courts in the cases cited above. 
The remaining question was whether defendant was barred based on the 
April, 1997 letter of agreement. Through misquotation and artful use of 
nomenclature FCCS attempts to mislead this Court and argues that there were no 
material facts in dispute. FCCS first undisputed material fact was that FCCS was 
defendant's employer from 1995 to 1997. First, as all of the documentary evidence, 
including letters of agreement, etc. show, FCC was defendant's employer not FCCS. 
and FCC employed the defendant from 1992 to 1997. Thus the plaintiffs first 
material fact is demonstrably untrue. 
Plaintiffs second alleged undisputed material fact involves a statement in the 
"Compensation Agreement," a letter dated April 9,1997. (See Plaintiffs Addendum 
4B.) That letter does not mention FCCS anywhere, rather the letterhead refers to 
Franklin Quest Consulting Group, Formerly Shipley Associates, (which was later 
identified in plaintiffs filing to the Maryland federal Court as a wholly owned 
subsidiary of FCC. Accordingly, the plaintiff has admitted that it is not the entity that 
entered into the April 9,1997 agreement. 
It's third material fact relates to the Release signed by the defendant, 
(Plaintiffs 4C), again FCCS is not mentioned anywhere. Finally the defendant notes 
13 
that neither the plaintiffs allegation to this Court nor his addendum (as well as these 
same allegations to the trial court) are not supported by any affidavits, sworn 
testimony, or other form of admissible evidence. Plaintiffs one paltry offering, the 
W-2, was sent to defendant at least four months after his termination. 
Plaintiffs sole legal argument in support of its claim that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding that the facts presented to it supported its summary 
judgment Order, is that the defendant is not entided to relief for a claim of quantum 
meruitbecause there is an express agreement governing his compensation with FCC. 
FCCS's counsel's argument is totally misplaced. 
First, there is no express agreement between FCCS and the defendant (nor 
sufficient notice of an assignment as discussed above.) 
Second, even if the language in FCCs letter of agreement with the defendant 
applied, it does not preclude additional compensation. This letter adopts by reference 
a prior "Employment Agreement" which is not part of the record. Without this 
additional document, the plaintiffs submission was incomplete. The section of the 
letter addressing compensation stated that the defendant will be paid on a 
commission basis. The letter goes on to state FCCs policy that commissions are only 
paid on services delivered while the defendant is employed by FCC. This description 
of an unwritten policy does not state a definitive rule. Further, FCC engaged the 
defendant to sell products as well as services. There is no provision in this letter 
for payment and timing of payment for products sold. It is plaintiffs contention that 
this brief description of policy is a complete description of the contract terms 
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between FCC and the defendant on the issue of the timing of sales and commissions 
earned. This is not the case, at a minimum in the case of products sold. The 
language quoted by plaintiff was insufficient to support its motion for summary 
judgment or the trial court's' findings thereafter 
Third, the agreement presumes that the employment relationship would 
not be terminated by FCC in bad faith The quoted provision does not apply to 
FCC's termination of the defendant under those circumstances. 
Fourth, the language of the release explicidy leaves open the question of 
compensation for sales that were not completed before FCC's termination of the 
defendant's employment, a number of which are listed in the defendant's Maryland 
complaint. 
Fifth, while the defendant was admittedly an at will employee of FCC, no one 
may terminate an at will employee in violation of federal, state or local law. Under a 
suit pending in Maryland Circuit Court, the defendant has sued FCC for 
discrimination. If the defendant prevails, it will establish that FCC terminated the 
defendant in bad faith. Furthermore the termination may not have been legally effective. 
Either way, a ruling in the defendant's favor will establish that FCC had no legal right 
to (a) induce the defendant to enter into a commission only employment agreement 
providing for commissions to be cut off as of the date of the last day of work; (b) 
urge the defendant to perform his job based on an expectation of continued 
employment; and then (c) terminate the defendant illegally and in bad faith. 
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Sixth, the release the plaintiff attaches to all its pleadings is short and to the 
point. It refers to sales completed before termination on September 12, 1997. The plaintiffs 
complaint addresses sales completed where the delivery of services had not been 
completed before defendant's termination, sales for products for which the defendant 
was not compensated and "future sales or for seminars held after the effective date of 
his termination." (Plaintiffs Addendum 2). Since the release applies only to sales of 
services before the effective date of the defendant's termination, it clearly is not 
applicable in this case. 
In order for the trial court to have granted the plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment, the court must find that there was a contract of employment between the 
parties and that the contract addressed the necessary issues. "|l]n evaluating a 
contract, this court must first ascertain whether the contract was integrated and 
second whether it was ambiguous." Bailey-Allen Company, Inc. v. Kur%etf etal, 876 P.2d 
421 (Utah 1994) citing Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Bloomquist, 773 P.2d 
1382,1385 (Utah 1989). In the Bailey case, the court found that the contract was 
ambiguous in that it provided no guidance relevant to the proper remedy for breach. 
(The same is true in the instant case.) The court, therefore, held that no enforceable 
contract existed and recovery under quasi contract was appropriate. The contract 
fails in the instant case fails on the same grounds as that in Bailey-Allen, thereby 
allowing for recovery for unjust enrichment. 
In addition, the issue exists as to whether or not there was ever a meeting of 
the minds between FCC and Melvin. As noted in paragraph 29 of his supplemental 
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declaration (Appellant's Brief, Attachment C, paragraph 29), the defendant assumed 
when he signed the letter of employment that the commission term in the 
Compensation letter did not apply if FCC were to unilaterally terminate him. 
Therefore, there does not appear to have been a meeting of the minds on or about 
April 9,1997, which would give rise to a binding contract. 
In order to dispose of the case via summary judgment the trial court had to 
determine: 
1) whether or not there was a meeting of the minds that created an 
express contract evidenced by the letter of employment; 
2) whether or not the plaintiff acted in bad faith; 
3) whether the disputed sentence in the April, 1997 employment letter is 
applicable to the relief the defendant requested; 
4) whether quantum meruit applies; 
Rule 56 U.R.C.P. requires a trial court to specify in its order the finding the 
facts that appear without substantial controversy. In its summary judgment Order the 
trial court stated 'With respect to Plaintiff Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc.s Motion 
for Summary Judgment, there are no genuine issues of material fact and Plaintiff is 
entided to judgment as a matter of law.6" The trial court failed to make the necessary 
6
 Yet plaintiff argues to this court that these meager findings were sufficient to 
support the trial court's declaratory judgment Order which stated: 1) Franklin Covey 
(which Franklin Covey is unclear) has no contractual, implied or other obligation to 
pay the Defendant Melvin any compensation related to seminars held or future 
seminars scheduled to be held or products sold subsequent to September 12,1997; 
(2) the Release signed by Defendant Melvin on November 13,1997 bars all claims 
related to payment of compensation or commissions; and (3) Franklin's policy and 
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findings. "Summary judgement is appropriate only when there is no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law/' Crowther 
v. Mover, 876 P. 2d 876, 878 (Utah App. 1994). "[A]U inferences must be resolved 
against the moving party when a determination is made as to whether a factual dispute 
exists". See Kline v. Signet Bank/Maryland, 651 A. 2d 422 (Md. App. 1995), citing Berkey 
v. Delia, 413 A.2d 170 (1980). "On appeal from a summary judgment, we view the 
facts and inferences fairly drawn from them in the light most favorable to the losing party." 
Winegar v. Froerer Corp. 813 P.2d 104,107 (Utah 1991). "A summary judgment may be 
granted only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Winegar at page 23; Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. 
Clearly each and every material fact alleged by the plaintiff to be undisputed 
was, in fact, disputed by Mr. Melvin. In this case Melvin met his burden of presenting 
some evidence, by affidavit, or otherwise, raising several credible issues of material 
fact. See Dupler v. Yates 351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah 1960). Yet the trial court chose to 
ignore each and every one. "Without adequate findings of fact, there can be no 
meaningful appellate review," Willey v. Willey, 866 P.2d 547, 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). The record created by the trial court fails to allow for adequate review. "To 
allow the trial court to impose speculation on the adjudicatory process violates the 
basic premise upon which our judicial system is founded. All parties are absolutely 
entitled to a fair and impartial hearing and adjudication of their affairs," Willey v. 
Willey, 914 P.2d 1149,1150 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). The defendant submits that 
practice with respect to the payment of commissions to separated Account 
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throughout this process he has been denied both the substance and even the appearance 
of a fair and impartial adjudication. The defendant further submits that in 
extraordinary cases "when it is made to appear that the court has failed to correctly 
apply principles of law or equity or that the judgment has so failed to do equity that it 
manifests a clear abuse of discretion this court on review will take appropriate 
corrective action in the interests of justice." Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149,1150 (Utah 
App. 1996) citing Watson v. Watson, 561 P.2d 1072,1073-4 (Utah 1977). Defendant 
submits that, at a minimum, the trial court abused its discretion in its finding of facts 
requiring remand, and that, at this Court's discretion corrective action beyond remand 
would be appropriate in the interests of justice since the trial court so completely 
failed to apply principles of fairness, law and equity. 
VI. T H E TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN APPLYING 
ITS FINDINGS TO MARYLAND LAW. 
While the defendant did not raise this issue in his brief to this Court, the 
plaintiff has felt it necessary to raise and argue this issue. It can be addressed (and 
dismissed) summarily. 
First, plaintiff contends that the trial court did not attempt to extend its ruling 
to Maryland, (see footnote 2 declaratory judgment Order, "[TJhis Court finds that the 
declaratory relief furnished herein is required under both Utah and Maryland law.") 
and only included this statement in its ruling to avoid the necessity of engaging in a 
conflict of laws analysis. There is no indication from the record that a conflict of 
laws analysis was either considered or sought. 
Executives is not violative of law. 
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Second, the whole import of plaintiff s actions and the trial court's rulings was 
to foreclose the defendant his day in court, any court, if possible. This action is 
consistent both with those actions and intent. 
Third, the ruling is irrelevant, even if the plaintiff were to try to have the trial 
court's ruling upheld to prevent judicial action in Maryland. See Libert)/ Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. RotchesPork Packers, Inc., 969 R2d 1384.88 (2nd Cir. 1992) in which the 
Second Circuit recognized that a court may take judicial notice of a document filed in 
another court 'not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other Htigation, but 
rather to establish the fact of such htigation and related filings." Accordingly, a court 
may take judicial notice of another court's order only for the limited purpose of 
recognizing the "judicial act" that the order represents or the subject matter of the 
htigation. See also, United States v. Garland, 991 F.2d 328, 322 (6th Cir. 1993); Colonial 
Leasing Co. v. Logistics Control Group Int% 762 R2d 454,459 (5th Cir. 1985); FDIC. 
OTlahaven, 857 R Supp. 154,157-58 (D.N.H. 1994). Thus, plaintiffs attempt to end 
run the Maryland Courts through his misuse of the Utah Courts is unavailing. 
Article 7, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, states that "[N]o person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.: The overreaching, 
abuse and misuse of the Court of Utah in this case by the plaintiff in its efforts to 
deny the defendant even the appearance of due process cries out for redress. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing and for all of the reasons stated above, 
it is respectfully requested: 
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1. That this Court enter an Order dismissing the instant action for lack of 
jurisdiction or in the alternative remand this matter to the trial court 
with instruction to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal in favor 
of the defendant 
2. That this Court enter an Order dismissing the instant action on 
whatever grounds it deems appropriate or in the alternative remand 
this matter to the trial court with instruction to enter the appropriate 
judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant. 
3. Further, that this Court enter an Order awarding costs and attorney's 
fees to the defendant or in the alternative remand this matter to the 
trial court with instructions to enter the appropriate judgment for costs 
and attorney's fees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Marsha A. Ostrer. Esq. 
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ADDENDUM 
ATTACHMENT A 
David Melvin 
812 Whittington Terrace 
Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 
(301) 593-3364 FAX (301) 593-2987 
Defendant, ^w se 
IN T H E THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
David Melvin, 
Defendant. 
Civil Case No. 980901616MI 
Judge David S. Young 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT OR ORDER 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, theprv se Defendant 
respectfully submits this reply memorandum in support of his Motion for Relief from 
Judgment or Order pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) of the U.R.C.P., and in response to plaintiffs 
memorandum states as follows: 
1. While the plaintiff attempted to collapse both Rule 60 motions filed by the defendant 
into one response, the defendant will treat them separately and requests separate rulings 
as they relate to very different issues with different results. 
2. After trotting out all of the same tired arguments, the essence of plaintiffs response to 
the defendant's Rule 60(b)(1) motion is that he now claims that the filing was not an 
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actual assignment but rather a pleading alleging the assignment. In any event it still fails 
because: 
a. The "pleading" fails to conform with the requirements of Rule 17 which requires 
that the case be pursued by the "real party in interest," and makes no provision 
for such assignments. 
b. Section 78-33-2 and 4 likewise require standing to sue and make no provision for 
the "assignment" of those rights to a non party. 
c. In fact, as usual, plaintiff has taken a highly novel position to protect an act that 
is not authorized by statute or case law and, of course, asserts none for this 
court to rely upon if it were to rule in plaintiffs favor. It is ludicrous to assert 
that the Consent to be Bound document is "evidence of an assignment" that 
had previously been made when there is no legal basis for the assignment to be 
made at all. The plaintiff engages in this sophistrific bootstrapping to no 
purpose. A party either has standing or it doesn't. Absent specific statuatory 
authorization, it can't be assigned and no such authorization exists. Estate of 
Martin Haw v. Harv, 254 UAR 19, 20 (Utah App. 1994). The plaintiff is not "a 
party authorized by statute" to sue in another's name without "joining the party 
for whose benefit the action is brought" Rule 17(a) nor does it fall within any of 
the other Rule 17(a) exceptions. Therefore, whether the Consent to be bound is 
the assignment itself or merely evidence of the assignment doesn't matter since 
no authorization exists. 
3. This court has never ruled upon the defendant's contention that the evidentiary value of 
the so called "Consent to be Bound" was substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice as raised in the defendant's original motion. O'Banion v. Owens-Corning 
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Fiberglass Corp., 968 F.2d 1011 (10th Cir. 1992) and cases cited therein. Should the court 
find this to be true, then the plaintiffs whole case falls apart. Certainly, since this issue 
has not previously been raised it is appropriate to bring it to the trial court's attention 
prior then raising it on appeal. "Rule 60(b)(1) provides a trial court may relieve a party of 
a judgment in a case o f . . . mistake of law by the trial court." Bischelv. Merritt, 278 UAR 
29, 30 (Utah C t App. 1995). 
The Motion also raises the issue that the findings of fact are insufficient to support the 
conclusions of law. "It has long been the law in this state that conclusions of law must 
be predicated upon and find support in the findings of fact." GMmor v. Wright, 209 UAR 
6, 9 (Utah 1993) citing cases back to 1917. Without the actual documents, this argument 
could not be presented to this court. Again, it is appropriate and a proper use of judicial 
resources to bring this to the attention of the trial court, before raising the issue on 
appeal. SeeBischeL 
The plaintiffs contention that Maryland case law has been briefed and presented to this 
court is just false. Either that or plaintiff neglected to serve that pleading on the 
defendant. Rather this court, "mechanically adopted findings of fact and conclusions of 
law prepared and submitted" by plaintiff "without modifying them or changing them in 
any respect." A process frowned on by the appellate courts. Atlantic Control Products 
Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc. 780 P.2d 1258, 1260 (Utah 1989). And, the plaintiff responded to 
this opportunity by trying to immunize itself in every way it possibly could. 
Finally the plaintiff argues that the defendant's Rule 60(b)(1) motion is an attempt to 
gain a second round in the trial court before filing its appeal. To the contrary, the 
defendant is merely trying to obtain an adequate record to appeal from. "Without 
adequate findings of fact, there can be no meaningful appellate review," Willey v. Willey, 
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866 P.2d 547, 551, 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Willy v. Willy, 914 P.2d 1149, 1151 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1996); Willy v. Willy, 333 UAR 8,10 (Utah, 1997) and an appellate court is 
forced to remand an action to the trial court (on occasion, several times) in order to 
obtain adequate findings to review. This is wasteful of judicial resources and places an 
unfair burden on the party forced to continually apply to the appellate courts for relief. 
4 
